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ABSTRACT 
Although encryption is used to protect data from being read by unintended recipients it still does not ensure complete 
safeness. The reason being that information can be gathered by an eavesdropper by indirect inferences like packet 
classification and traffic analysis. Thus our aim is to protect the header from being read by selective insider jammers. In 
such a scenario where we have a selective insider jammer who is active only for a period of time, protecting the header 
information should be given higher priority as these adversaries classify the packets using first few bits from the header 
fields and add bit errors to the packet if it is an important one. Header information can be protected using modified 
anonymous routing scheme where we employ multiple level of encryption of the packet to prevent the adversary from 
classifying the packet using the header information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The major threat to wireless network is Denial of Service attack. An adversary can target on the communication 
of the nodes and can attempt to create an attack to prevent the efficient communication. In wireless networks such attacks 
are susceptible from peer nodes. Internal attacks, which are launched from compromised nodes, are more sophisticated in 
nature. These attacks exploit knowledge of network secrets and protocol semantics to selectively and adaptively target 
critical network functions. Attack selectivity can be achieved, for example, by overhearing the first few bits of a packet, or 
classification of transmissions based on protocol semantics. Internal attacks, henceforth referred to as insider attacks , 
cannot be mitigated using only proactive methods which rely on network secrets, because the attacker already has access 
to such secrets. They additionally require mechanisms with built-in security measures, through which the attacker can be 
detected and its selective nature can be neutralized. 
Problem Definition 
Security and dependability is a prime criterion when we consider exchanging important information between two 
parties. Even when we employ encryption techniques on payload part, header fields can reveal much critical information 
that an eavesdropper can gather. When the adversary is an insider compromised node who is aware of the network 
secrets and protocol semantics, the vulnerability is more. In such a scenario where we have a selective insider jammer 
who is active only for a period of time, protecting the header information should be given higher priority as these 
adversaries classify the packets using first few bits from the header fields and add bit errors to the packet if it is an 
important one. Header information can be protected using modified anonymous routing scheme where we employ multiple 
level of encryption of the packet to prevent the adversary from classifying the packet using the header information. 
Adversary Model 
The adversary model considered in this paper is an inside jammer. The adversary can easily launch internal 
attacks with data alteration, message negligence, selective forwarding, jamming, etc. The insider attackers are severely 
destructive to the functioning of a network. As the jammer is from within the network, jammer has access to shared 
cryptographic keys, aware of protocol semantics and the network topologies and may be equipped with advanced 
hardware like multiple radios, multiple directional antennas and high computational power. The adversary can launch a 
denial of service attack from within the network. More precisely, the adversary is not only insider but also selective. It 
targets messages of high importance like control packets. It follows the strategy of smart jamming i.e. “classify-then-jam”. 
The adversary also has directional antennas which allow reception of signals in one node and jamming the same signal at 
another node. Furthermore, the adversary can physically compromise network devices and can  recover stored 
information including cryptographic keys, PN codes, etc. 
RELATED WORK 
The impact of jamming attacks has been focussed under various threat models which include constant jammers, 
reactive jammers, random jammers and deceptive jammers. In [1,2], Pro˜ano describes the selective jamming attacks in 
the physical layer. In this, the mitigation strategies include packet hiding schemes which causes considerable 
communication and computation overhead. In [13], Timothy X Brown considers the problem of an attacker disrupting an 
encrypted victim wireless adhoc network through jamming. This paper address jamming and sensing as two related 
functions and suggests simple methods for making victim networks less vulnerable to packet classifiers. But roles of 
multiple attackers were not described and scaling to large adhoc networks were not considered. In [7], L. Lazos address 
the problem of preventing control-channel DoS attacks manifested in the form of jamming. But the proposed scheme can 
be utilized only as a temporary solution for re-establishing the control channel until the jammer and the compromised 
nodes are removed from the network. Fang Liu suggests a novel idea of insider attacker detection in wireless sensor 
networks [3]. By exploiting the spatial correlation among the networking behaviours of sensors in close proximity, the 
detection algorithm can achieve high detection accuracy and a low false alarm rate. But the detection algorithm can be 
specialized by exploring the degree of the correlations existent among different aspects of sensor networking behaviours. 
This case is not considered in this paper. Various forms of sophisticated attacks launched from adversaries with internal 
access to the WMN are described by L. Lazos in [6]. These adversaries are detected by aggregate behavioural metrics 
such as per-packet reputation and credit. However, these metrics cannot detect attacks of selective nature, where only a 
small fraction of “high value” packets is targeted. 
SYSTEM DESIGN AND MODELING 
 System design defines two scenarios, one in which the real time packet classification takes place and the 
other which includes the schemes to mitigate the selective jamming attack, which results due to classification of packets in 
real time. 
 Real Time Packet Classification 
Real time packet classification describes how the adversary can classify the packets in real time, before the 
packet transmission is completed. When the classification process reveals that the packet has important message, it is 
easy to jam the packet based on the strategy of the jammer node. 
At the physical layer, a packet m is encoded, interleaved and modulated before it is transmitted over the wireless 
channel. At the receiver, the signal is demodulated, deinterleaved and decoded to get the original packet. A packet 
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includes the MAC layer header, IP layer header and TCP layer header. In the MAC layer, the MAC header is removed 
after processing and the packet is forwarded, then in the IP layer, the IP header is removed after processing and the 
packet is forwarded and similarly in the TCP layer, the TCP header is removed and the packet is forwarded as shown in 
Fig 1. 
 
Fig 1 Headers for each layers appended to data 
` Physical  layer header includes 56 bits. Symbol 1, Symbol 25 and part of Symbol 24 and 2 constitute the physical 
layer header. MAC layer header includes 224 bits. Symbol 3, Symbol 4, Symbol 5, Symbol 6, Symbol 7, Symbol 8, Symbol 
9 and part of Symbol 2, 10 and 24 constitutes the MAC layer header. IP layer header includes 160 bits. Symbol 11, 
Symbol 12, Symbol 13, Symbol 14, Symbol 15, Symbol 16 and part of Symbol 10 and 17 constitutes the IP layer header. 
TCP layer header includes 160 bits. Symbol 18, Symbol 19, Symbol 20, Symbol 21, Symbol 22, Symbol 23 and part of 
Symbol 17 constitutes the TCP layer header. This can be depicted by Fig 2. 
 
Fig 2 Header fields for each layer 
At the modulator, the output of the interleaver is modulated as 25 OFDM symbols. Here, 
1 symbol = 24 bits 
25 symbols = 600 bits 
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Fig 3 Header Fields grouped as 25 OFDM symbols 
 Fields in the headers that leads to packet classification 
A packet can be classified based on the headers of various layers. For example, the MAC header typically 
contains information about the type and subtype of MAC frame. The TCP header reveals the end-to-end source and 
destination nodes, the transport-layer packet type (SYN, ACK, DATA, etc.), and other TCP parameters. Not all the header 
field can cause classification of a packet. Only certain header fields can reveal whether a packet is having important data 
or not. 
Classification in datalink layer mainly occurs in the symbols, frame type and WEP. Frame type reveals the control 
information which leads to classification. When the WEP field in Flags is set to 1, it indicates that encryption schemes 
have been used, leading to classification. Classification in network layer mainly occurs in the symbols, Type Of Service 
and Option. TOS reveals about the type of service provided. Option reveals about the source routing informations. 
Classification in transport layer mainly occurs in the symbols, destination port and URG. Destination port reveals about the 
destination of the respective packet. When the URG is set to 1, it indicates that the packet is important, leading to 
classification. One of the important fields that lead to classification is header length (IHL). If header length of the entire 
packet exceeds 600 bits, then it indicates that encryption schemes have been used. This leads to classification. 
 
 
Fig 4 Real time packet classification 
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 Mitigation of Real Time Packet Classification: Modified anonymous routing scheme  
Although encryption is used to protect data from being read by unintended recipients it still does not ensure 
complete safeness. The reason being that information can be gathered by an eavesdropper by indirect inferences like 
packet classification and traffic analysis. Thus our aim is to protect the header from being read by selective insider 
jammers, which can be achieved by anonymous routing scheme called onion routing in wireless networks. In onion routing 
the data is wrapped in layers of encryption in a data structure called as an onion, which is transmitted over the network. 
The onion is constructed in such a way that it prevents any eavesdropper from gaining information about the parties 
involved in the communication or the nature of their data exchange. 
Onion Routing 
Onion routing is the mechanism in which the sender and the receiver nodes communicate with each other 
anonymously by means of some anonymous intermediate nodes called as onion routers. It protects against traffic analysis 
and makes it very hard for an eavesdropper to determine who is talking to whom over the network. It concentrates on 
encrypting the packet header in  such a way that only the intended destination understands that the packet is meant for 
him. Onion refers to the transmission data wrapped  in multiple layers of encryption with the route information in each layer 
of encryption. It is done in such a way that when the data moves from one onion  router to the next, each onion router 
strips a layer of the onion using its private key to find its next hop, and routes the packet accordingly.This goes on till the 
packet reaches the receiver. Thus every onion router knows only its previous and next hop. Padding may be applied at 
each  onion router to maintain the size of the onion. So data passed along this anonymous connection appears different to 
each onion router. Also since an onion is decrypted at each router there is no correspondence between an incoming and 
outgoing onion for a particular router. Hence data cannot be tracked in route and even a compromised onion router cannot 
be of much help. Even if an onion router is compromised only the previous and next hop would be visible but the actual 
sender and receiver would still be hidden. This provides added resistance to an  attacker. Since the size of the onion 
reduces as it nears the destination an attacker can infer details about the destination. To avoid this onions are padded at 
each onion router to maintain the size of the onion. Padding is simply adding redundancy. This is a really big advantage 
because it complicates traffic analysis, as an attacker cannot infer location or other details of the destination by getting 
hold of an onion. Every onion router has details of only its previous and next hop. So even if an onion router has been 
compromised the attacker can only get the encrypted onion with the next hop. He will not be able to decrypt the onion 
without the private keys and hence will not infer any valuable information from it. 
Algorithm 
The basic anonymous routing scheme is based on the concept of onion routing. It is divided into 3 phases; route 
discovery, route reply and data forwarding. This protocol makes a few assumptions as follows:  
 Every node in the network has a permanent identity known to all other nodes in the network.  
 The source and destination share a secret key KSD.  
 Nodes share secret keys only with a limited set of other nodes.  
 Every node establishes a broadcast key with its one hop neighbourhood.  
The basic anonymous routing protocol has been modified to create a modified anonymous routing scheme, which has 
been applied as the mitigation scheme. The algorithm is as follows, 
Source: S 
Targeted destination: D 
Sequence number: SN 
Destination identifier and key: DIK  
Initial value of ttl field: ttlinit 
Asymmetric key pair: AKP1, AKP2 
Encrypted link identifiers:   EAKP1(nS; kS) 
Route Discovery: 
At source node S; 
1) S generates asymmetric key pair AKP1 and AKP2. 
2) S generates Destination identifier and key (DIK) that can only be opened by node D that has knowledge about the Ksd. 
DIK : EKsd (D,S,AKP2,ttlinit ) 
3) S also generates random pair of link identifiers (ns,ks)  ,used to recognize RREP messages. 
4) S encrypts the pair of link identifiers using AKP1 
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5) Finally the packet is broadcasted by S. 
 S* : D; S; ttlinit ; AKP1; DIK; EAKP1(ns, ks) ,SN 
At receiving node Ni; 
1) Checks whether it is the targeted destination of the RREQ by verifying destination id, D. 
2) If so, Ni tries to decrypt the DIK to check whether the first part of the DIK  id matches with its own id. If it doesn’t match, 
Ni is not the targeted destination. 
3) If Ni is not the targeted destination, node checks whether SN  has been recorded in the routing table. If it is recorded 
then discard the RREQ message. Else Ni stores it in the routing table. 
Ni stores in routing table: D, S, ni-1, ki-1, SN 
4) If ttl>1, decrement ttl and encrypt the link identifiers as onion using AKP1 and append this to the broadcast message. If 
ttl=0 then discard the packet. 
Ni * : D, S, ttl ,AKP1, DIK; EAKP1 (……..(EAKP1 (ni-1; ki-1),ni,ki)) 
5) When Ni is the targeted destination, it stores the complete RREQ in memory and it decrypts DIK to get ttlinit, AKP2. It 
uses AKP2 to get link identifiers of all the intermediate nodes. 
6) Compute the number of hops to select the shortest route, h=ttl- ttlinit and generate n+1 link keys, Si 
7) Construct a reply onion which contains link ids of all intermediate nodes and encrypt them several times using ids of 
intermediate nodes in reverse order. set the ttl value as h+1. 
8) Unicast this route reply as  EkD(S;ttl); Ekn(nn,sn,sn-1, Ekn-1(nn-1,sn-1,sn-2,…….., Eks(ns, ss))),nn 
Route Reply: 
At the destination D; 
1) D generates n+1 link keys Si for 0≤i≤n where s0 = ssource. Link key will be shared between Ni and Ni+1. 
2)The onion can be generated as On = Ekn(nn,sn,sn-1, Ekn-1(nn-1,sn-1,sn-2,…….., Eks(ns, ss))) 
3) Unicast this route reply as EkD(S;ttl); On,nn. The identifier and ttl field of RREP are encrypted with the current unicast key 
to hide them from insider adversaries. 
At the receiving node Ni, 
1) Node Ni strips one layer of the onion, decrement ttl value and encrypt the new header with Ni’s previous hop key (if it is 
not indented receiver). 
2) If ttl>1, decrement the ttl and stores the secret keys (si,si-1) and previous hop. Forward the packet to the next hop. if 
ttl=0, discard the packet. 
3) If the id matches with that of id S, then it is the intended recipient. Strip the onion to get the intended message 
4) Finally initiate the process of data forwarding. 
Data Forwarding: 
1) Data messages will have the same format as RREQ packets. 
S* : D; S; ttlinit ; AKP1; EKsd (D,S,AKP2,ttlinit ,M); EAKP1(nS, kS) ,SN 
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 Fig 5  Architecture for mitigation scheme 
RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
Simulation results enable the evaluation of the network performance with respect to the network density/ number 
of nodes. It explains the network performance with respect to the attacks caused by the selective jammer as a result of 
packet classification. Xgraph is a plotting program in  ns-allinone package which can be used to create graphic 
representations of simulation results. The output files in the Tcl scripts are used as the data sets for xgraph. 
In this scenario, 24 nodes are taken and placed in different positions with flat grid topology of which 15 nodes 
take part in the transmission of data. Continuous Bit Rate traffic sources are used for traffic model. Finish time of the 
simulation is set to 2ms. Omni antenna model is used. Size of the topography is set to 980 for the x axis and 1640 for the 
y axis. Number of nodes refers to the network density. In this system there are 24 nodes in the network of which 15 nodes 
are involved in the packet transmission. The group size of the topology is 4 and the number of nodes per group is 6. Thus 
the total number of nodes in the topology is 24. 
Simulation has been done for 2ms.The time taken for real time packet classification in the presence of a selective 
jammer at different position has been analysed  in the initial stage. In the next stage, modified anonymous routing scheme  
has been applied as a mitigation scheme for preventing the selective jammer from classifying the packet. Then the time 
taken for real time packet classification with the mitigation scheme has been analysed. Graph was generated for both the 
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cases and the graphs were compared to analyse the efficiency of the proposed scheme. The average throughput for the 
existing and proposed system  has also been computed to analyse the impact of the mitigation scheme. 
Time taken for real time packet classification with and without the mitigation scheme
  A selective jammer jams a packet by reading the header information and then by classifying the packet 
into important and unimportant packets where the important packets are jammed. With the mitigation scheme, the jammer 
takes considerable time for classification and thereby the jammer is delayed in real time packet classification. Without the 
mitigation scheme, the average time taken by a selective jammer for real time packet classification ranges from 3.4451ms 
to 3.89893ms. With the mitigation scheme, the average time taken by a selective jammer for real time packet classification 
ranges from 4.60105ms to 4.95877ms. This clearly depicts that the packet would reach the destination before the jammer 
could classify the packet. 
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Fig 6  Time for packet classification vs position of jammer 
Average Throughput analysis with and without the mitigation scheme 
Average throughput can be defined as the average number of packets transmitted per unit time. It is the average 
rate of successful message delivery over a communication channel. The graph in Fig 7 depicts the average throughput 
with and without the mitigation scheme. The throughput drops drastically in the presence of a selective jamming attack. 
The throughput is approximately 79%  in the existing system which has been increased to 92% by applying the modified 
anonymous routing scheme .In the existing system, the average throughput is less in the presence of a selective jammer. 
In the proposed system, the jammers ability to classify the packet has been alleviated using modified anonymous routing 
scheme which leads in the increase of throughput to 92 %. 
 
Fig 7 Average throughput comparison in existing and proposed system 
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CONCLUSION 
Wireless networks are prone to various external and internal security threats. While most external attacks can be 
mitigated easily, internal attacks are much harder to counter because the adversary is aware of the network secrets and 
its protocols. Creating broadcast communication with jamming resistant environment in the presence of inside jammers 
remains a challenging problem. Using cryptographic techniques of encrypting both header and payload can prevent 
jamming to a certain extent. But cryptographic keys can be easily exposed in the event of node compromise. However, the 
enhanced level of security comes at the expense of performance, because broadcasted messages have to be transmitted 
multiple times and on multiple frequency bands to guarantee robust reception. Moreover, even if packet reception of 
critical messages is ensured, inside adversaries are in complete control of the traffic routed through them. A selective 
inside jammer can impart both data selective jamming and control channel selective jamming. Most existing methods 
assume a continuously active adversary that systematically drops or add bit errors to the packets. These adversaries are 
detected by aggregate behavioural metrics such as per-packet reputation and credit. However, these metrics cannot 
detect attacks of selective nature, where only a small fraction of “highly important” packets is targeted. Furthermore, when 
the adversary drops only a few packets, his behaviour can be indistinguishable from dropping patterns due to congestion 
or poor wireless conditions.  
In such cases, a clear evaluation has to be done to understand how real time packet classification is done by a 
compromised node to identify the packet as a highly important one. In this paper, various header informations that reveal 
the importance of the message have been studied and a scheme has been proposed  to prevent the real time packet 
classification of the packet during transit. Simulation results are based on the network performance with respect to the 
network density. Finally the conclusions made are, 
 How the adversary classified packets in real time. 
 Illustrated the impact of selective jamming attacks on the network performance. 
 How packet classification can be mitigated through delaying scheme. 
 Evaluation of the delaying of packet classification scheme is done. 
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